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McELROY LECTURES
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AS IF FAMILY
MATTERS
STEPHEN L. CARTER"
The subject of my lecture is parents, religion, and the schools. I
will seek to sketch, and partly defend, a controversial proposition
about the relationship among the three. My goal is less to persuade
than to provoke. I want us all to think about the relationship in ways
a little bit different from the mainstream.
Let me begin by telling you a story involving my own family.
My wife and I have two wonderful children. After my book, The
Culture ofDisbelief, was published in 1993, the publisher sent me on a
book tour. One morning, I found myself in the studio of a radio
station in New York City, as the guest on a talk show. The host and I
were having a wonderful time batting around various ideas about the
separation of church and state, the role of religion in politics, and
other things, when, all at once, I was brought up short by a caller who
said something like this: "Excuse me Professor Carter, did I hear you
say that you and your wife send your children to a religious school?" I
said, ''Yes.'' (I thought ofanswering no, we send them to an Episcopal
school, but, as a good Episcopalian, I could hardly say that.) Upon
hearing my answer, the caller asked: "Does that mean that you and
your wife are trying to raise your children in your religion?" ''Yes,'' I
said, "we are."1 She said, "I don't really think you should do that."
Now, as a lawyer and, still worse, a law professor, I'm very rarely
at a loss for words, but I was not quite sure what to say. The good
thing about being on a radio call-in show, however, is that the host is
there to say things like, "Why do you say that caller?" The host did his
" B.A., Stanford, 1976; J.D., Yale, 1979; Law Clerk, Judge Spottswood W.
Robinson, III, U.S. Ct. of App., D.C. Cir., Justice Thurgood Marshall, U.S. Supreme
Ct.; Associate, Shea & Gardner, D.C.; Cromwell Prof. since 1991. This article is an
edited and updated version of the McElroy Lecture, delivered on April 13, 2000.
1. At the time of the lecture, both our children attended a religious elementary
school. They no longer do, although the opinions I express in the lecture have not
changed.
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job. The caller answered, "I think it's wrong to indoctrinate little
children that way."
As I continued to flounder, the host asked, ''What do you think
Professor Carter and his wife should do instead?" The caller offered
a practical solution: "I think there should be no discussion of religion
in the home until the children reach a mature age." She suggested
age 18 - perhaps because that is the age at which they can watch
pornographic movies. She added a last comment along the following
lines: "The responsibility of a parent is to tell the children about all of
the world's great religions and encourage the child to pick one."
Now, I do not want to suggest that I can tell you in a clever
anecdote that I have identified a national trend. But I do think it is
useful to note the caller's premise-that you pick and choose your
religion the way that you might change your tie or your dress. This
premise suggests that religion is a relatively unimportant part of
human personality, something easily (and, of course, unimportantly)
modified into something else. In that premise, we can find the seeds
of many of the conflicts that sometimes arise between well-
intentioned and deeply religious parents, on one hand, and well-
intentioned teachers and school boards, on the other. We have seen,
in recent years, titanic battles over such matters as school curriculum,
classroom prayer, the teaching of creationism, and a variety of other
issues. The law in this area has been, in my judgment, established
almost entirely from the point ofview of the needs of the state, which
is to say that virtually all of the decided cases in this area (and
certainly the most important Supreme Court precedents) begin with
the state and go on to try to find an appropriate place for the family,
the children, and the family's religion within that entity.
I want to offer an inversion of pur common way of thinking
about these problems. I want to begin, not with the state, but with
the family, because I view the family as logically prior to the state.
What this means, as a matter of philosophy, is simply that you give the
family, rather than the state, priority in weighing interests.2 What it
means as a matter of constitutional law is more complicated, and we
are about to see why.
When you look at the public schools today, there are a lot of data
that people use to prove a lot of different things. I 'want to focus on
two data points. First, a very significant minority of public school
parents say they would send their children to private schools, if they
could afford to do so. Second, of parents in America who choose to
2. I recognize that beginning with the family rather than with the state is at least
controversial and perhaps quite objectionable for many contemporary philosophers.
I do not offer a justification here, because the lecture is more in the nature of a
thought experiment than a settled proposition. I am asking, that is, "What would be
different ifwe were to begin with the family rather than the state?"
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send their children to private schools, roughly 88 percent choose
religious schools. Another way of looking at this data, I would
suggest, is that perhaps one of three public school parents would
send their children to religious schools, if they could afford to do so.
Now, I do not mention these data to open a discussion about
vouchers and charter schools, although I will have something to say
about the subject of vouchers at the end of my remarks. My interest
in this lecture, however, is not in what happens when parents decide
to act on their desire to move their kids out of public schools. I am
interested in accommodating the religious concerns of the parents
while their children are still in the public schools. And I am
interested in how one does this when beginning, remember, with the
proposition that the family's needs have priority over the needs of the
state.
A little over seventy years ago, the Supreme Court decided a very
important case that for some reason tends to be omitted in the
modem constitutional law courses: Pierce v. Society of Sisters.S Pierce v.
Society of Sisters involved an Oregon ballot initiative that prohibited
parents from sending their children to private schools without the
permission of the state. It was, in effect, an effort to shut down all the
private schools in Oregon. It was a closely watched ballot initiative
and a closely watched case across the country because a number of
other states were considering similar initiatives at the time. The case
made it to the Supreme Court in 1925 in a lawsuit, interestingly
enough, brought by two schools, one Roman Catholic school and one
private military academy, claiming, in the terms so familiar in the
days of so-called substantive due process, that the initiative interfered
with their liberty of contract. The Supreme Court agreed with that
argument and, in the course of a very brief opinion, (those were the
good old days when the courts wrote brief opinions even for perhaps
especially important cases) the Court referred to the fundamental
liberty of parents to direct the upbringing and education of children
subject to their control. Now, I want to place that case in a particular
historical perspective.
One has to understand where the Oregon law came from. Ifyou
go back to the middle of the nineteenth century, you have in
American history the genesis of that magnificent and democratic
American invention: the common school. The idea of the common
school was that what would make America special would be the
creation of a place where children from all walks of life would come
and study together, that everyone would have the chance to learn. As
so beautifully articulated by Horace Mann, a founding father of the
common school movement: "It may be an easy thing to make a
3. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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republic, but it is a very laborious thing to make republicans. ,,4 What
Mann meant was that a republic rests fundamentally upon a set of
shared understandings-shared values, ifyou will, a common outlook
on the world. He believed, fervently, that the American ideal would
survive only if there was a place where all of the nation's children
would come together, study, and learn what we might call the
American ideal.
The notion is a lovely one. The only problem is, from the
beginning, it did not work. It did not work because the states, from
the beginning, declined to establish common schools. I emphasize
the point because nowadays, when you read histories of the school,
they often jump from Horace Mann to the establishment of public
schools and compulsory education laws in the late nineteenth
century. They leave out a big chunk of history in between the two.
The rise of the public schools in the United States resulted from
the interplay of a number of complex factors, among them the needs
of the industrial economy for an educated work force, the change in
the demographics of American society from agrarian to urban, and
the ideology of progressivism, which included the professionalization
of school teachers. But another factor also entered in, playing both a
positive role and a negative one. I refer to the wave of immigrants
from Europe during the nineteenth century.
The positive role of immigration in the development of public
schools is straightforward: the young nation, remarkably hospitable to
strangers, absorbed the newcomers and took upon itself the
responsibility of educating their children. The negative role, less
talked about in the history, had consequences sufficiently profound
that they last until this day. For the immigrants also aroused a nativist
sentiment that, in an unhappy way, also led to a fervor for
compulsory schooling.
The European immigrants who arrived on America's shores in
the nineteenth century were seen by many Americans as bringing
what were routinely referred to as foreign religions, a term that
included, basically, Roman Catholicism and Judaism. Faced with
what was widely perceived as a threat, one state after another began
to enact compulsory schooling laws. Although the schools seemed to
follow the wisdom of Horace Mann, they were defended, in one state
after another, as simply involving the Americanization of the children
of the immigrants. It did not take the Catholic and Jewish parents
very long to realize that what was really going on was the
Protestanization of the children of the immigrants. Many states
4. HORACE MANN, THE IMPORTANCE OF UNIVERSAL, FREE, PUBUC EDUCATION (quoted
in THE REpUBLIC AND THE SCHOOL: HORACE MANN ON THE EDUCATION OF FREE MEN 91-
92 (Lawrence A Cremin ed., Columbia University Teachers College 1957».
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established their schools with the clear and often openly stated
intention ofwiping out the "foreign religions."5
Indeed, it is no accident that the state of Massachusetts adopted
the first compulsory education law in the 1840s, at a time when the
rising political power in the state was the Know-Nothing Party, an
outgrowth of the Know-Nothing Order, a nativist anti-Catholic
organization of the era. By the mid-1850s, both houses of the state
legislature, as well as the governorship, were controlled by the Know-
Nothings. The Know-Nothing Order required its members to swear
never to vote for or support a political candidate "unless he be an
American-born citizen, in favor of Americans ruling America, nor if
he be a Roman Catholic."6
By the middle of the century, it was plain that the nation's
compulsory schooling laws had a decidedly anti-Catholic and anti-
Semitic bias. Roman Catholic and Jewish parents responded to this
realization in different ways. Two movements ran on parallel tracks.
One was a movement to try to secularize public education. In the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the so-called public schools
routinely included Bible instruction (but only, of course, study of the
Protestant Bible) as well as spoken prayer, notjust to open the school
day, but usually at various other times during the day as well. Many of
the immigrant parents therefore chose to battle to remove the more
explicit symbols of Protestant faith from the schools.
The parallel movement was the explosion of parochial schools -
in particular, the Roman Catholic parochial schools. This movement
was an understandable response to what the public schools were
doing. The immigrant parents wanted to raise their children in their
own faith instead of having their nation, with state money, wean them
away. This movement to establish parochial schools provoked two
remarkable and unprecedented developments. The first of those, as
we have seen, was compulsory education laws. Ever since Horace
Mann, advocates of common schools had argued that compulsory
education was important, but no state paid serious attention to it,
with the sole exception of Massachusetts, until the great wave of
immigrants was upon them.
5. For discussions of some of this history, see, e.g., JAY P. DOLAN, THE AMERICAN
CATHOUC EXPERIENCE: A HISTORY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT (Doubleday
1985); CHARLES LESLIE GLENNJR., THE MYTH OF THE COMMON SCHOOL (University of
Massachusetts Press 1988); and WARREN A. NORD, REUGION AND AMERICAN
EDUCATION: RETHINKING A NATIONAL DILEMMA (University of North Carolina Press
1995). The discussion in the lecture is drawn generally from these sources.
6. The oath is quoted in HUMPHREY J. DESMOND, THE KNOW-NOTHING PAR1Y 12
(New Century Press 1905). I discuss the party in more detail, along with other
anti-Catholic movements of the day in STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE DISSENT OF THE
GOVERNED: A MEDITATION ON LAw, REUGION, AND LOYAL1Y 38-49 (Harvard University
Press 1998).
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The second development was a new principle of constitutional
law. For the first time in American history, legislators explained that
it was unconstitutional to give public money to religious education.
Throughout the eighteenth and most of the nineteenth centuries,
public money had flowed freely to support religious education, to
support churches directly, to all kinds of things, but only when
Roman Catholic schools were established did one state government
after another suddenly announce that the aid was unconstitutional.
Keeping tax dollars away from Catholic schools was certainly the true
motive of the Blaine Amendment, proposed in the Congress in 1875,
which covered in the innocuous language of disestablishment an
effort to keep the schools Protestant.7 Although the federal Blaine
Amendment was rejected, several states adopted versions of it, many
of which remain in their constitutions to this day. But, to the dismay
of America's nativists, the withholding of funds made no difference.
Catholic schools flourished anyway. It was that flourishing that led to
the Oregon ballot proposition.
The ballot proposition was adopted in Oregon with a clear
intention of making it impossible for the Catholic schools to exist,
and, indeed, it was often defended by its supporters as simply
clarifying the compulsory education laws, making plain that the need
for every child to attend school was a need for every child to attend a
public school. When the case reached the Supreme Court, Oregon
defended the law explicitly on the ground that it was necessary to
Americanize the immigrant children, which could not be done if they
were sent to schools not under the control of the state.s
I mention so much history in order to strip away the
presuppositions we tend to make about what has been, over the years,
the balance of power among public schools, religious schools, and
religious parents. It is not my intention to launch an attack on the
public schools, an American institution in which I deeply believe. I
only wish to point out that it is possible, ifwe look at the history, for
parents to quite reasonably and rationally fear that what is going on
in the schools represents, at least in part, an effort to wean their
children away from the religion and values the parents are trying to
teach. Like other institutions of government, the schools must be
viewed with a healthy skepticism. The classroom has been, often in
7. See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption o/the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the
Non-Establishment Principle, 27 ARIz. ST. LJ. 1085, 1145-1150 (1995); and Joseph P.
Viteritti, Blaine's Wake: School Choice, The First Amendment, and State Constitutional Law,
21 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 657 (1998) (providing background on the Blaine
Amendment).
8. I review the history of the Pierce litigation in the Supreme Court in Stephen L.
Carter, Parents, Religion, and Schools: Reflection on Pierce, 70 Years Later, 27 SETON HALL
L. REv. 1194 (1997).
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the past, a tool for making it harder for particular religions to survive.
Parents who make that argument today, whether or not they are
correct, certainly are not being irrational or "ahistorical."
Let us grant, then, that many parents have religious reservations
about the public schools, believing, fairly or unfairly, that the
curriculum or atmosphere might make it harder for them to raise
their children to follow their faith. What are we to do about that?
One obvious solution is to consider a form of what used to be
called vouchers and what are, more and more, known as school
choice programs. No longer is school choice merely the favorite of
scholars and activists on the right.9 Although the tendency in our
political debates is to argue over school choice as though the only
important question is whether children whose parents take advantage
of the programs improve their test scores once they have moved from
public to private schools, the most interesting argument in favor of
the programs is that they can help equalize the power disparity
between rich and poor to make effective moral choices for their
children. Right now, well-to-do parents can purchase for their
children private educations they believe to be morally superior to
public school educations. A program of educational assistance to
impoverished and working-class parents might help them to afford
similar choices. Most of the world's industrialized nations have
chosen to set up programs of this sort, but America, for better or
worse, has made a different choice.
Our different choice, I would suggest, carries 'with it a certain
responsibility to the parents to whom we refuse to give educational
assistance. The task, therefore, is to try to understand exactly what,
within the confines of the Constitution, we can do to accommodate
parental concerns - particularly moral concerns - within the public
schools. Ifwe decide we would rather not accommodate the parents'
moral concerns, we are, I would suggest, well on the way to destroying
public education in America. In the end, when you coerce people to
patronize an institution that they do not like, you are going to lose
both the people and the institution. In short, it is precisely those who
most strongly oppose vouchers who should be most interested in
finding ways to accommodate the moral concerns of parents within
the public schools.
Let us now consider, briefly, two particular areas in which we see
these battles fought today. One of these areas is school curriculum.
The other classroom prayer and other religious observances.
Let us think, first, about curriculum.
9. See, e.g., the discussion in James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE LJ.
249,310-15 (1999).
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The paradigmatic case is as follows: A parent whose child is
enrolled in a public school discovers that the child is learning in, say,
a biology class or a history class something that the parent thinks will
make it more difficult to raise that child in a particular religion.
What is the correct response for the school when the parent says, "I
don't want my child studying this stuff. I don't care what other
children study, but this is not for my child?"
Many public schools around the country try very hard to
accommodate those parental requests, and they are wise to do so. By
honoring parental requests to excuse children from morally
objectionable curricular matter, the school authorities show great
respect for the parental decisions that might otherwise be expressed
through leaving the schools. Unfortunately, some public schools act
less wisely and, for reasons that I will admit I find obscure, when
schools refuse to accommodate the parents, the courts often side with
the schools.
Let me give you a couple of examples.
About a decade ago, some Christian parents in New York
objected to particular aspects of the sex education curriculum in the
high schooL The parents did not ask to have the objectionable
curriculum removed from the schooL They asked only to have their
own children excused from particular days of instruction. (On those
days, the class would be discussing, among other subjects, so-called
"safe sex.") The school refused the parental request. The parents
sued, claiming that this interfered, not only with the directive of
Pierce, but also with their more general First Amendment right of
religious freedom, which they argued includes the right to raise their
children in their religion. The case was decided in a New York state
court, which seemed to want to have it both ways. The court honored
the parental request by excusing the students, but on the condition
that the parents agree to make sure the children received the
objectionable instruction through some other means!10
The problem with this decision, in the terms in which we have
been speaking, is that it does not place the family prior to the state.
Moreover, it suggests a peculiar vision of the family, in which parents
are, in effect, conscripted by the state into raising the type of children
the state prefers to have, whatever that type may be. The great
Lutheran theologian, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, in his posthumously
published Ethics, warned against ever allowing the states to try to
standardize its citizens. The state, Bonhoeffer warned, must not be
permitted "to direct and shape the coming generation." To do so, he
argued, "constitutes a disastrous interference in the natural order of
the world." Those who try to do it "deliberately deprive themselves of
10. Ware v. Valley Stream High Sch., 550 N.E.2d 420 (N.Y. 1989).
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unsuspected human forces."u When parents are conscripted by the
state to raise their children according to the state's moral
preferences, the family is being coerced in a way that limits human
possibility.
So Bonhoeffer was right. But there is also a deeper problem.
Consider, as in the case just mentioned, a public school curriculum
that includes instruction in what has come to be called "safe sex."
What is the underlying message of safe-sex teaching? The message, I
think, goes something like this: "Look, it's a risky world out there, it's
a difficult and dangerous world, and some of the risks are sexual.
You young people are growing into that world, and it is vitally
important that you learn how to minimize those risks. The
information we are going to give you could, quite literally, save your
life."
That is not a bad message, but a nation that truly values diversity
(as ours now and then claims to do) has to allow space for religious
parents who want to offer a different message, one that runs
something like this: "It is, indeed, a risky world out there, but we are
building, for our children, a morally coherent story that has different
answers to the same questions of risk, a story in which we believe they
will be able to avoid these risks, or a story in which we will offer them
different tools with which to handle these risks when they arise. But
your tools are inconsistent with ours, and make our story harder to
tell."
A claim of this kind strikes me as perfectly reasonable, not at all
oppressive, entirely rational, and quite straightforward and clear.
The parent who offers it sees the world somewhat differently than the
school that proposes the safe-sex curriculum. Yet it is difficult to find
a basis (other than hegemony, of course) for preferring one to the
other. A nation that believes in the family, diversity, and religious
freedom ought to find it acceptable, not because the parents are
necessarily right, but because, on such fundamental religious and
moral issues, the parents have the right to be wrong.
All through history, an important component of religion has
been the preservation and transmission of moral understanding from
one generation to the next. When parents seek the freedom, without
the interference of the state, to raise their children in their religion,
they are seeking no more than the freedom to continue to do what
religious people have always done: to take responsibility for moral
instruction. For the state to interfere in a significant way with this
parental effort strikes me as a plain violation of the separation of
church and state - a separation, if we go back to its seventeenth
11. DIE1RICH BONHOEFFER, ETHICS 172-73 (Neville Horton Smith trans., Touchstone
1995).
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century American roots, that was plainly intended to presexve the
space for religious practice from state intrusion, not to protect the
state or the larger culture from religion. 12
Now let us consider a second case.
I have in mind the case of Mozert v. Hawkins County Public
Schools,I3 decided in 1987 by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit. To oversimplify the case a little bit, Mozen involved
a parental objection to a public school curriculum described as,
among other things, teaching tolerance. The parents believed,
rightly or wrongly, that the curriculum involved equipping the
children with tools that would make more difficult the parental task
of moral and religious teaching. The problem is difficult and
sensitive. On the one hand, there is an obvious societal interest in
the raising of children who are intellectually curious.14 On the other;
ifwe begin, as I suggested at the outset we try to, with the family, then
there is an interest of at least equal strength in giving families the
space they need to raise children according to their particular
religious ethic. If the family is prior to the state, then the state's
interest in creating these particular critical tools, I believe, has to
yield to the parental interest.15
But might the case be different if the curriculum in question
involves not teaching tolerance or the technology of relatively safe sex
but, say, mathematics or science? Suppose, in other words, that we
present the dissenting religious parent not with a moral question, but
with a scientific one.
I find the case harder, but I still tend to side, in a limited way,
with the parents. Absent some core curriculum that we might decide
in a democratic fashion,16 I think that parents, as part of the exercise
of their religious liberty, should have a broad freedom to exclude
12. See, e.g., the discussion in TIMOTHY L. HALL, SEPARATING CHURCH AND STATE:
ROGER WILLIAMS AND REUGIOUS LIBERTI (University of Illinois Press 1998).
13. 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987).
14. I reject the notion that there is a strong societal interest in raising children who
are "tolerant" in the abstract, because I consider the category of "tolerance" a morally
empty one. That does not mean I support what has come to be called "intolerance."
It is simply that abstract tolerance, in the absence of a theory ofwhat precisely should
be tolerated and why. is incoherent. I discuss this problem in STEPHEN L. CARTER,
CMLI1Y: MANNERS, MORALS, AND THE ETIQUETTE OF DEMOCRACY 207-25 (Basic Books
1998).
15. An interesting analysis of these problems is in Stephen Gilles, On Educating
Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 937 (1996). For a thoughtful
argument to the contrary, see AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION (Princeton
University Press 1987). I should specify that Professor Gutmann's view is far closer to
the mainstream of academic thought on this problem than my own.
16. If the core curriculum is not decided democratically, I am uneasy with
enforcing it against dissenting religious parents.
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their children from objectionable programs and teaching in the
schools. This would not include the freedom to prevent others from
learning the material. I do not suggest that parents who believe
evolution to be false should necessarily be able to keep it out of the
classroom. I only suggest that they should be able to keep their own
children out of the classroom while the objectionable material is
being taught.
One might of course object to this proposal on the ground that a
general parental freedom to remove children from objectionable
instruction, even in science and mathematics, might mean we wind
up with a nation of dunces. I do not find this claim persuasive. Even
assuming what is by no means obvious - that the mass of material
included in standard secondary school science and mathematics
courses is necessary for appropriate exercise of the functions of
democratic citizenship - we have no way to predict whether large
numbers of parents would, in fact, insist on keeping their children
out of large numbers of courses. In a nation as materially competitive
as ours, this seems a dubious assumption: most parents will be too
busy worrying about grades and test scores. If, on the other hand, it
should tum out to be true that large numbers of parents would
choose to reject large parts of the public school curriculum, I would
suggest that we would learn from those decisions not that something
was wrong with the parents, but that something was wrong with the
curriculum.
Besides, we already allow parents of means to buy their children's
way out of the public school curriculum. So, in effect, arguments
over what "must" be taught are really arguments over what "must" be
taught to those children whose parents send them to public schools.
The notion that children should be forced to study subjects of which
their parents disapprove, even when the great majority of parents in
the same area also disapprove, strikes me as dangerous, even if we
happen to think the parents are wrong. The notion is dangerous
because, in coercing parents to expose their children to what their
religion teaches is wrong, it runs against the grain of a serious respect
for religious liberty. Perhaps my fellow citizens should have the
authority to coerce me to send my children to study the
aforementioned core, something decided by some consensus
mechanism. But, even there, we have risk. For much of the
nineteenth century and the first years of the twentieth, public
education possessed a core that had, among its functions, the
Americanizing (that is, as we have seen, the Protestantizing) of
immigrant children.
The alternative is to deny to religious parents their ability to be
religious parents - to, in effect, separate their religiousness from their
parental role. Although contemporary liberalism teaches that the
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dominant motif of religion (as of other aspects of life) is choice, a
religion may teach otherwise, and many do. In orthodox Christian
terms, for example, one cannot decide to be a Christian; one must be
called to be a Christian. What might appear to the outsider as the free
choice of an individual is actually an outward sign of the working of
the Holy Spirit within that individual. For me as a Christian parent,
moreover, this description is true. So, if the schools teach to the
contrary that one actually interrogates and challenges the call, the
schools are, in Christian terms, teaching something that is not only
false, but dangerously false, because it sows confusion on a
proposition that is, in the absence ofany confusion, abundantly clear.
To recite in response the importance of the freedom of my
children to choose whether or not to be Christian is simply for the
state to take the position that my religious understanding is false.
The state, in other words, takes sides against my religion and its
teaching on the very nature of the religion itself - that is, the nature
of Christianity. And it does so by intruding itself into the very heart
of my family, the transmission of the faith from one generation to the
next.
Most religions exist dynamically in time - partly in the past,
partly in the present, partly in the future. A religion lives and grows
by projecting itself over time, by working in the present to connect
the future with the past. For most religions, an important tool of that
projection is the family itself. If I am unable, as a parent, to protect
my children from official interference in the process of that dynamic
projection - the process of the formation of their faith - then the
state is, in a real and frightening way, taking upon itself the authority
to decide which religions should be allowed to survive and in what
forms.
Enough on the curriculum. Let me talk briefly about prayer.
Let me first make my position clear. I count myself as an
opponent of organized classroom prayer in public schools. I
recognize that most Americans are in favor of it, and I do not
consider the supporters of school prayer oppressive or tyrannical. I
do not think they are dangerous fanatics or a lunatic fringe. I think
they are, by and large, thoughtful people, deeply concerned about
the nation's moral direction, trying to find ways to nudge the future
in what they consider a better direction.
I share many of their concerns, but I disagree with their solution,
precisely because I am beginning with the proposition that the family
is prior to the state. Classroom prayer is simply another mechanism
through which the state interferes with the ability of parents to raise
children in their religion. Were my own children in public school, a
classroom prayer would bother me, because the prayer in use would
surely be a watered down, so-called non-sectarian prayer. As
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Christian parents, my wife and I teach our children to pray in Jesus
Christ's name. Prayer of other kinds may be interesting but it is not,
in the orthodox sense, Christian. Consequently, were the school to
teach my children that non-sectarian prayer was a proper way to pray,
it would be interfering with ourjudgment as parents.
If, on the other hand, the school acceded to our view and
decided to have the children recite a Christian prayer, it would
equally violate the religious freedom of parents who pray in other
traditions, of parents who do not pray, and of Christian parents who
prefer prayers of other kinds. I see no way out of this paradox, other
than to proclaim that there is one correct way for Americans and
their children to be religious - precisely what the First Amendment
forbids. So, by putting the family prior to the state, we readily wind
up with a position against organized classroom prayer.17
We are left, then, to wonder whether there is a way to
accommodate the desires of many, perhaps most parents (including
the overwhelming majority of Mrican American parents) for their
children to pray in school in some organized fashion? Let me suggest
two possible paths.
A few years ago, I was a member of a panel of scholars talking
about religion in public life. Another member of the panel raised
the question of whether public schools should have chapels. Now, I
must say that I was immediately skeptical. But, as I have thought
about it over the years, I wonder whether the idea is a good deal less
ridiculous than it sounds. Airports have chapels, generally paid for by
public money.18 Nobody is forced to use an airport chapel, but it is
there for anyone who wants to use it.
Now, what would it mean if a public school contained a chapel?
It would mean that there was a place, a physical location, where
children who wished to, could go for silent prayer or meditation.
Students who preferred not to use it could ignore it entirely. One
might reasonably object, however, that the very existence of a chapel
might create pressure upon the children who did not want to pray,
particularly if lots of their classmates were using it. I would quite
agree that peer pressure of that kind is not a good thing in schools. I
17. Ironically, if we were to put the state prior to the family, we could easily justify
classroom prayer, for the state could simply decide that praying in a particular way
was best for all children. If the state's interests come first, it is difficult to see why this
decision would be more objectionable than, say, a decision by the state to teach
evolution and require all students to study it in the face of their parents' objection.
(Do not rush to say that one is religious and the other is not, for the religious parent,
as we have seen, might think othenvise).
18. I should add that chapels in public airports are hardly ,vithout controversy. See,
e.g., Hawley v. City oj Cleveland, 24 F.3d 814 (6th Cir. 1994), which upheld an airport
chapel against an Establishment Clause challenge.
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am not entirely certain, however, that the possibility of peer pressure
alone should lead us to a judgment that a chapel would violate the
Constitution.
Consider, after all, the other side of the problem. Suppose
instead a school much like the schools we generally have today, a
school where there is no safe haven for prayer, perhaps even a school
in which praying is considered, by peers, to be "uncool." (Or "totally
whack," as many teenagers today might say.) Now the school, by not
providing a place of refuge, is fostering an atmosphere in which there
is peer pressure not to pray. Ifwe believe, as the courts keep telling
us, that what the First Amendment commands of the government is
neutrality toward religion, then it cannot be the case that it is worse
for the school to foster an atmosphere in which there is pressure to
pray than for the school to foster an atmosphere in which there is
pressure not to. In constitutional terms, the two pressures should be
seen as equally impermissible.19
A chapel might be one means for compromise. But there are
others. For example, the children who want to pray together to open
the school day might go collectively to some central location where
they will pray, not under the leadership of a teacher, but under the
leadership of each other. Plainly, a proposal of this kind possesses
the same drawback: a collective departure of a large number of
students might create pressure on those who would rather not pray.
We might even conclude that this alternative is worse than a chapel
because the collective departure could seem more ominous, or more
desirable, to the dissenter than the use of a room somewhere in a less
organized fashion.
One might answer all of this by insisting that no compromise is
necessary because school children are always free to sit and pray
silently if they like. But this answer should be troubling if we take
religious liberty seriously. Insisting that the acceptable form of prayer
in school is both silent and individual privileges one form of religious
practice above others. Such a rule allows (no, requires) the state to
say, in effect, that it will decide which forms of prayer may be
practiced in school, and which may not. Although some judges and
scholars occasionally write as though this is, indeed, what the
Constitution commands, it is difficult to see why the schools should
19. One might object that the school is doing nothing in my second example, that
the peer pressure results from the choices made by students. But we would not allow
the school to escape its responsibility so easily if, say, some students were harassing
others because of race or sexual orientation. Ifwe treat religion seriously, we should
take the view that the school certainly is responsible for creating an atmosphere in
which either there is no serious peer pressure not to pray or there is a place of refuge
in which to escape one's pressuring peers.
HeinOnline -- 78 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 15 2000-2001
2000] REliGIOUSFREEDOM AND FAMILY 15
be so free to do battle with the family over what forms of prayer are
appropriate.
I mentioned earlier that part of the task duty of raising children
in a religion involves the creation of a morally coherent world for
those children. Imagine, then, parents who have trained their
children to such a world, raised them to pray several times a day,
often in communion with others, when, suddenly, at age five or six,
the children are thrust into a situation in which their religious
practice is not merely discouraged but, possibly, forbidden. When I
imagine such a scenario, I think about cultural shock. I also think
about accommodation. But, mostly, I think about bilingual
education.
I recognize that bilingual education is controversial. But one of
the strongest arguments in its favor has always been that it might be,
for a limited period of time, in the early years of public schooling, an
important tool for acclimating children raised in households where
the primary language is not English. My point here is not, however,
to re-examine that old debate, but only to propose an analogy. For
many children of religious parents, thrust suddenly into a school in
which prayer is not spoken, could be very much like being thrust
suddenly into a school in which the language of the home is not
spoken. It is difficult to find any justice (in either case) in the view
that we need do nothing to ease this transitional period to
accommodate the religious needs of children who face this sudden
cultural shock.
Ifwe refuse to find ways to accommodate the desires of religious
parents to raise their children without state interference, one of two
things will happen. Either we will wipe out a lot of religions (which a
simple respect for religious freedom would discourage) or we will
drive an increasing number of families out of the public schools
(which a belief in the importance of the common school would
discourage). Moreover, if an increasing number of families leave the
public schools, we will face growing pressure to spend tax dollars on
private education, including religious education.
I am not an opponent of vouchers, even when they pay for
religious education, and I do not believe that they are
unconstitutional.20 But I do think people who consider them a bad
idea, or an unconstitutional one, should recognize how a too-
vigorous, uncompromising secular ethos in the public schools can
20. I should inform the reader that I have deleted here a discussion of vouchers
that was included in the original transcript, principally because it is dated. I discuss
my views on vouchers in more detail in STEPHEN L. CARTER, GOD'S NAME IN VAIN: THE
WRONGS AND RIGHTS OF RELIGION IN POLITICS (Basic Books 2000), especially chapter
12, and STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE DISSENT OF THE GOVERNED: A MEDITATION ON LAw,
RELIGION, AND LOYAL1Y (Harvard University Press 1998).
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increase parental support for them. I suspect that much of the
pressure could be decreased through a more thoughtful and sensitive
effort to accommodate the religious needs of students in public
schools, and to position the schools as allies rather than enemies of
parents seeking to build moral cocoons around their children. To
accomplish this, some compromises in the secular ethos of the public
schools might be necessary. I have argued for ways in which we might
be able to reach such compromises without treading on the rights of
all the other families who might hold very different religious views.
All of this is necessary, of course, only if we begin with a view of
the family that places it prior to the state, or, at minimum, reasonably
high on the state's list of priorities. Perhaps it is too optimistic, or too
naive, to imagine that we could ever agree on so radical a notion.
But, if we do not, if we continue to insist that dissenting religious
parents accommodate themselves to the schools, rather than the
other way around, we will hardly be in a position to complain when
those parents, alienated and angry, decide to fight back.
